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CHANGING PATTERNS IN ILLINOIS' SCHOOL TORT
IMMUNITY
SHELLEY

B.

GARDNER*

The past two decades have witnessed conflicting changes in Illinois' judicial and legislative interpretations of the type of tort immunity
granted teachers and school districts. Until 1959, Illinois courts applied
the doctrine of sovereign immunity to school districts, their employees,
and agents, considering the school district to be a quasi-municipal corporation.I In Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302,2
the Illinois Supreme Court rejected this concept of sovereign immunity
of quasi-municipal corporations, holding that school districts and their
employees would henceforth be liable in tort for negligence.3 Legislative reaction was swift. Before the final decision was handed down in
Molitor in 1959, the Illinois General Assembly passed legislation which
limited school district tort liability to $10,0004 and granted full immunity to other quasi-municipal corporations. 5 In 1965, in an attempt to
regain a measure of the school district sovereign immunity lost in Molitor, the Illinois General Assembly amended the Illinois School Code to
include a broad grant of in loco parentis authority to teachers in school
districts. 6 This grant of parental immunity did indeed protect teachers
* Associate, William D. Maddux & Associates, Chicago, Illinois; J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1976; B.A., Knox College, 1967.
1. Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 I11. 332, 49 N.E. 536 (1898) is the principal case establishing Illinois' adherence to the sovereign immunity doctrine in regard to public schools. Seegenerally Franklin, Tort Liability of Schools, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 429.
2. 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), modifiedon other
grounds, 24 Ill. 2d 467, 182 N.E.2d 145 (1962).
3. 18 I11.2d at 21, 163 N.E.2d at 96.
4. 1959 I11.Laws 2060, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 821-31 (1975). The statute was subsequently held unconstitutional in Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School Dist. No. 84, 39 I11.
2d 136, 233 N.E.2d 549 (1968). See also Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 41111. 2d 336, 243
N.E.2d 203 (1968).
5. Law of June 30, 1959, ch. 57/, § 3a, 1959 I11.Laws 1954 (repealed 1965) (affects forest
preserves); Law of June 30, 1959, ch. 34, § 301.1, 1959 Ill. Laws 1890 (repealed 1967) (counties),
Law of June 30, 1959, ch. 105, § 12-1, 1959 Ill. Laws 782 (repealed 1967) (park districts).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-24 (1975) (applicable to municipalities of less than 500,000
population); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-84a (1975) (applicable to municipalities of greater than
500,000 in population). Both sections are identical in providing the following:
Teachers and other certified educational employees shall maintain discipline in the schools.
In all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children, they
stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the pupils. This relationship shall extend to all
activities connected with the school program and may be exercised at any time for the safety and
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from tort liability. The Illinois Supreme Court in Kobylanski v. Chicago Boardof Education7 found the amended provisions of the Illinois
School Code to extend in loco parentis status to all activities of the
school program, whether disciplinary or non-disciplinary. Thus, an action would lie against schools and educators only for willful and wanton misconduct.8 A recent decision by the Illinois Supreme Court,
Gerrity v. Beatty,9 and subsequent appellate decisions may portend an
erosion of the Kobylanski rule of blanket school tort immunity from
negligence.
This article will briefly review the background of school tort immunity and parental immunity in Illinois, including a presentation of
the significant Molitor case. Post-Molitorinterpretations of school tort
immunity, both legislative and judicial, will then be explored, especially the amended provision of the Illinois School Code which granted
the board in locoparentisauthority to teachers. The case of Kobylanski
0 will be fully discussed. Finally, the
v. Chicago Board of Education1
1978 Illinois Supreme Court case of Gerrity v. Beatty" and later appellate-decisions will be analyzed.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SCHOOL TORT IMMUNITY IN ILLINOIS

The doctrine of sovereign immunity has its foundation in the feudal concept, "[T]he King can do no wrong." 1 2 Thus, the state was not
answerable in its courts of law for its negligent acts or omissions. Russell v. Men of Devon' 3 is customarily cited as the first judicial articulation of this rule. Although the doctrine was perhaps unsuited to a
4
republican form of government, as some writers have suggested,' it
gained ready acceptance in the United States.' 5 The Illinois Supreme
Court first applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity to school dissupervision of the pupils in the absence of their parents or guardians. Nothing in this Section
affects the power of the board to establish rules with respect to discipline.
7. 63 I11. 2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976). A second case, Chilton v. Cook County School
Dist. No. 207, Maine Twp., 26 I11. App. 3d 459, 325 N.E.2d 666 (1975) was consolidated in the
Kobylanski decision.
8. 63 Ill. 2d at 175, 347 N.E.2d at 710.
9. 71 111. 2d 47, 373 N.E.2d 1323 (1978).
10. 63 Ill.
2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976).
11. 71 Ill. 2d 47, 373 N.E.2d 1323 (1978).
12. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971).
13. 2 Term Rep. 671, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
14.

See, e.g., Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1924); Green, Free-

dom ofLitigation, (III) MunicipalLiabilityfor Torts, 38 ILL. L. REV. 355, 356 (1943-44) (hereinafter referred to as Green).
15. See, e.g., Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 23 Am. Rep. 332 (1877); Ham v. Mayor of
New York, 70 N.Y. 459 (1877); Wixon v. City of Newport, 13 R.I. 454, 43 Am. Rep. 35 (1881).
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tricts in 1898. In Kinnare v. City of Chicago,16 the court stated:
[T]he state acts in its sovereign capacity, and does not submit its action to the judgment of courts, and is not liable for the torts or negligence of its agents, and a corporation created by the state as a mere
agency for the more efficient exercise of governmental functions is
likewise exempted from the obligation to respond in damages, as
master, for negligent acts of its servants to the same extent as is the
state itself, unless such7 liability is expressly provided by the statute
creating such agency.'
As the doctrine of sovereign immunity developed, distinctions
were drawn between municipal corporations, such as cities, villages,
and towns, and the quasi-municipal corporations, such as school districts. Quasi-municipal corporations were afforded complete immunity
from negligence' 8 while municipal corporations, although immune for
acts of negligence arising out of the exercise of their governmental
function, were answerable for negligence in the conduct of proprietary
functions.' 9 Thus, a municipal corporation was seen to enjoy "two
kinds of powers: one governmental and public, and to the extent they
are held and exercised. . . clothed with sovereignty; the other private,
' 20
and to the extent they are held and exercised. . . a legal individual.
The distinctions in immunity between quasi-municipal and municipal corporations and the further distinctions in the character of municipal functions added to the erratic legislative response to judicially
created rules of immunity. These distinctions also led to inequitable
results and uncertain interpretations of sovereign immunity. As one
commentator noted, the doctrine failed to differentiate immune activities from those to which liability would attach on any rational
grounds. 2 1 The discrimination inherent in the application of the immunity doctrine was recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court in a 1964
case involving Illinois' statutory park district immunity:
Many of the activities that frequently give rise to tort liability
are common to all governmental units. The operation of
automobiles is an obvious example. From the perspective of the injured party. . . there is no reason why one who is injured by a park
district truck should be barred from recovery, while one who is injured by a city or village truck is allowed to recover, and one injured
16. 171 Ill. 332, 49 N.E. 536 (1898).
17. Id. at 335, 49 N.E. at 537.
18. Leviton v. Board of Educ., 374 IU. 594, 30 N.E.2d 497 (1940); Lake County v. Cuneo, 344
Ill. App. 2d 242, 100 N.E.2d 521 (1951).
19. Merrill v. City of Wheaton, 379 Il. 504, 41 N.E.2d 508 (1942); Gebhardt v. Village of La
Grange Park, 354 IlL. 234, 188 N.E. 372 (1933).
20. Lloyd v. Mayor of New York, 5 N.Y. 369, 374, 55 Am. Dec. 347 (1851).
21. See Green, supra note 14, at 376.
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by a school district truck is allowed to recover only within a prescribed limit. And to the extent that recovery is permitted or denied
on an arbitrary basis, a special privilege is granted22in violation of
section 22 of article IV [of the Illinois constitution].
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court expressed dissatisfaction with the
evolution of a doctrine which through both legislation and judicial interpretation could act to permit, limit, or deny recovery, based not on
the character of the negligent act, but on the quality of "sovereignty" of
the governmental tortfeasor.
23
As early as 1921, the doctrine had come under attack in Illinois,
although the courts were several decades behind in responding to
scholars' challenges. As one commentator noted:
A municipal corporation today is an active and virile creature
capable of inflicting much harm. Its civil responsibility should be coextensive. The municipal corporation looms up definitely and emphatically in our law, and what is more, it can and does commit
wrongs. This being so, it must assume the responsibilities of the position it occupies in society. 24
The immunity established in Kinnare was, nonetheless, upheld by Illinois courts. In Lindstrom v. City of Chicago,25 the Illinois Supreme
Court declared the basis for the rule to be that a school district was
created solely to aid government administration. Unlike private concerns, quasi-municipal corporations were seen to exist merely to aid in
the orderly administration of sovereign functions. 26 Perforce, they
were cloaked in the sovereign's immunity. Immunity from tort liability
27
followed dissemination of governmental functions.
As the doctrine of sovereign immunity persisted, a basis for immunity other than nonjusticiable sovereignty came to be promulgated.
This was the "public fund" or "no fund" doctrine. 28 In brief, the rationale was that various governmental undertakings were done for the
public benefit, as distinguished from activities of the government in its
private or proprietary function. The government then acted as agent
for its citizens in performing functions like education. 29 Since public
22. Harvey v. Clyde Park District, 32 Ill. 2d 60, 65, 203 N.E.2d 573, 576 (1964).
23. See Holdsworth, The History ofRemedies Against the Crown, 38 L.Q. REV. 380 (1922).
24. Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations,4 ILL. L.Q. 28, 42 (1921).
25. 331 Ill. 144, 162 N.E.128 (1928). See also Nagle v. Wakey, 161 Ill. 387, 43 N.E. 1079
(1896); Wilcox v. City of Chicago, 107 Ill. 334, 47 Am. Rep. 434 (1883); Town of Waltham v.
Kemper, 55 Ill. 346, 8 Am. Rep. 652 (1870).
26. 331 Ill. at 146, 162 N.E. at 130.
27. Id., 162 N.E. at 131.
28. Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842) was the first case to delineate this
distinction. For a discussion of this distinction, see Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction
Between Public and PrivateFunctions, 16 OR. L. REV. 250 (1937).
29. See Casner & Fuller, Municpal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 437 (1941).
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functions were funded by taxes, the government was viewed as custodian and protector of public funds. 30 The diversion of such funds held
in the public trust to the payment of claims for injuries, it was feared,
would hinder essential governmental functions. Further, school districts, supported solely by taxes, were circumscribed by legislative directives in the use -of educational tax funds. Absent legislation
expressly granting the power to pay damage claims, school districts
(and other quasi-governmental entities) were thought to lack authority
to direct the payment of such claims, or to levy taxes for such pur31
poses.
Some erosion of the doctrine manifested in Thomas v. Broadlands
Community ConsolidatedSchool DistrictNo. 201,32 in which it was held
that a school district might be liable in tort to the extent of available
liability insurance, upon the rationale that the "public fund" was therefore conserved. The school district thus enjoyed the unique opportunity to determine sua sponte whether it would be answerable for its
tortious acts.
MOLITOR V. KANELAND COMMUNITY UNIT DISTRICT

No. 302

On May 21, 1959, the Illinois Supreme Court rendered its opinion
in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit DistrictNo. 302. 33 In the seminal opinion written by Justice Klingbiel, the court abolished the sovereign immunity doctrine as applied to school districts, holding that
school districts and their employees would be liable in tort for their
negligent acts and omissions. 34 Thomas Molitor, the minor plaintiff,
filed a complaint in negligence for severe burns received when a school
bus in which he was a passenger left the road, struck a culvert, exploded, and burned. The complaint was dismissed by the trial court,
and the appellate court affirmed. 35 The case then came before the Illinois Supreme Court on a certificate of importance.
The court in Molitor reflected at length on the development of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and the various theories developed in
justification of the doctrine, as well as scholars' criticisms. The court
30. See, e.g., MCQUILLAN ON MUNCIPAL CORPORATIONS § 353.24 (3d ed. 1977).
31. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Educ., 386 Ill. 508, 54 N.E.2d 498 (1944);
Leviton v. Board of Educ., 374 Ill. 594, 30 N.E.2d 497 (1940).
32. 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952). See also Tracy v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 160 (E.D.
Ill. 1954); Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).

33.

18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).

34. Id. at 20, 163 N.E.2d at 93.

35. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 20 Ill. App. 2d 555, 155 N.E.2d 841
(1959).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

rejected the public fund doctrine, commenting that its rationale appeared to be "that it is better for the individual to suffer than for the
public to be inconvenienced. '36 Nor was the existence of nonpublic
fund assets (e.g., liability insurance) influential, since "it would allow
the wrong-doer to determine its own liability. ' 37 Further, the court disagreed with the argument that the imposition of tort liability would
impoverish school districts and impair the educational process, stating,
"We do not believe that in this present day and age, when public education constitutes one of the biggest businesses in the country, that
school immunity can be justified on the protection of public funds the38

ory."

The concept of sovereign immunity was cursorily dismissed by the
court in Molitor as an archaic, absolutist doctrine lacking viability in a
democratic society. The court also remarked that imposition of tort
liability might tend to reduce school accidents in encouraging districts
to exercise greater care in the selection and employment of its agents.
Clearly, however, the fundamental basis of the Molitor decision is
found in the following statement by the court:
It is a basic concept underlying the whole law of torts today that
liability follows negligence, and that individuals and corporations
are responsible for the negligence of their agents and employees acting in course of their employment. The doctrine of governmental
immunity runs directly counter to that basic concept. What reasons,
then, are so impelling as to allow a school district, as a quasi-municipal corporation, to commit wrongdoing without any responsibility to
its victims, while any individual or private corporation would be
called to task in court for such tortious conduct?3 9
An acerbic dissent was filed by Justice Davis, joined by Justice
Hershey. 4° After raising the traditional justifications for perseverance
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the dissent notably attacked the
great irony of the majority opinion in Molitor. In its initial opinion of
May 21, 1959, the majority overruled the court-related concept of governmental immunity, interpreting in dicta a portion of the Illinois
School Code 4' whereby immunity was waived by the purchase of insurance as an expression of legislative dissatisfaction with the immunity
doctrine. 42 After rehearing, the final opinion was published on Decem18 Ill. 2d at 16, 163 N.E.2d at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20, 163 N.E.2d at 93.
Id. at 29, 163 N.E.2d at 98 (Davis, J., dissenting).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 29-11a (1957).
42. 18 Ii. 2d at 14, 163 N.E.2d at 92.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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ber 16, 1959. In the interim, the legislature had passed a series of laws
granting tort immunity to park districts, forest preserve districts, the
Chicago Park District, and Illinois counties, and granting school districts a limited tort immunity. 43 Under the 1959 revision of the Illinois
School Code, a $10,000 limitation was placed on public and private
schools' tort liabilities in relation to their proprietary functions and full
immunity was extended to their governmental function. 44
IN

PARENTIS AND PARENTAL IMMUNITY IN ILLINOIS

Loco

The 1959 revision of the Illinois School Code was declared unconstitutional in 1968 by the Illinois Supreme Court in Treece v. Shawnee
Community Unit School District No. 84.45 Since many of the other
1959 immunity statutes were ultimately declared unconstitutional by
the courts as well,46 once again the Illinois General Assembly began

mounting a defense to the courts' forays against governmental immunity. The activities of the General Assembly culminated in the Illinois
Tort Immunity Act of 196547 and sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the Illi48
nois School Code.
The 1965 revision of the Illinois School Code in sections 24-24 and
34-84a included the grant of in loco parentis authority to teachers in
school districts. This legislative grant of parental immunity provided
that:
Teachers .

.

. shall maintain discipline in the schools ....

In all

matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and
the school children, they stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the pupils. This relationship shall extend to all activities connected with the school program and may be exercised at any time for
the safety and supervision
of the pupils in the absence of their par49
ents or guardians.
43. See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 821-31 (1975).
45. 39 Ill. 2d 136, 233 N.E.2d 549 (1968).
46. Lorton v. Brown County Community Unit Dist. No. 1, 35 Ill. 2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 161
(1966) (school); Hutchins v. Kraject, 34 Ill. 2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274 (1966) (county); Harvey v.
Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964) (parks); Walker v. Forest Preserve Dist., 27
Ill. 2d 538, 190 N.E.2d 296 (1963) (forest preserve); List v. O'Connor, 19 Ill. 2d 337, 167 N.E.2d
188 (1960) (parks). See also Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 41 Ill. 2d 336, 243 N.E.2d 203
(1968).
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 to 10-101 (1975). For history and analysis of the Act, see
Baum, Tort Liability of Local Governments and Their Employees: 4n Introduction to the Illinois

Immunity Act, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 981; Cotteleer, llinois School Tort Immunity.- 19-59 to the Present,
2 Loy. CHI. L.J. 131 (1971); Latturner, Local Governmental Tort Immunity and Liability in Illinois,
55 ILL. B.J. 28 (1966).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a (1975).
49. Id.
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The minimum requisite for recovery under this statute was proof of
willful and wanton misconduct. 50
According to the statutory wording and subsequent judicial interpretation, 5' parental immunity was the basis for the sections 24-24 and
34-84a immunity grant to teachers. This basis was an outgrowth of the
development of parental immunity in Illinois.
In 1956, the Illinois Supreme Court in Nudd v. Matsoukas,52 addressed the doctrine of parental immunity in the context of a negligence action brought by an unemancipated minor for injuries sustained
as a result of his father's willful, wanton, and reckless operation of a
motor vehicle. 53 Defendant's motion to dismiss the action as contrary
to public policy was granted by the trial court and the judgment was
affirmed by an intermediate appellate court.
On appeal, the defendant relied primarily on two Illinois court
holdings54 to the effect that a minor is barred, absent statutory authorization, from suing a parent or an individual standing in loco parentis.
The Nudd court indicated, however, that there was severely conflicting
precedent with regard to this issue and that, moreover, the instant case
was distinguishable from the traditional context for invoking the doctrine of parental immunity. The Illinois Supreme Court indicated that
Nudd involved something more than simple negligence because the
complaint contained "an allegation of wilful and wanton misconduct." 55 The court referred to a number of jurisdictions that allow unemancipated minors to bring tort actions against their parents. The
Nudd court focused on an Oregon Supreme Court holding 56 which
limited parental immunity to conduct within the scope of parental authority. 57 Finding the Oregon limitation persuasive, the Illinois
50. Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Educ., 63 II. 2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976).
51.

Id.

52. 7 II. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
53. Id. at 609, 131 N.E.2d at 526. The plaintiffs damage claim named both his father and the
driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident as defendants. The complaint also contained a
wrongful death claim against the defendant-father for the deaths of his wife and another child
which occured in the same accident.
54. Id. at 611, 131 N.E.2d at 530. The cases that the defendant relied on were Foley v. Foley,
61 111. App. 577 (1895) and Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 260 111.App. 164 (1933). According to
the Nudd court, the parental immunity rule was first enunciated in Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss.
703, 9 So. 885 (1891). 7 Ill. 2d at 617, 131 N.E.2d at 530.
55. Id., 131 N.E.2d at 530.
56. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950). In Cowgill, the administrator of a
deceased minor's estate brought suit against the administrator of the child's father's estate. Both
father and child had died as a result of the father's operation of an automobile while under the
influence of alcohol.
57. Id. at 293, 218 P.2d at 456. The Cowgill court stated:
To hold that such drunken action is within the scope of parental authority would outlaw
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Supreme Court held that "public policy should [not] prevent a minor
from obtaining redress for wilful and wanton misconduct on the part of
a parent." 58 In so ruling, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the parental immunity doctrine, as a judicial creation, was subject to interpretation and modification by the courts.5 9
The Nudd limitation to the parental immunity doctrine was reaffirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Mroczynski v. McGrath.60 In
Mroczynski, an incompetent sued the estate of his father for damages
arising out of various alleged torts. 6 1 The defendant raised a number
of defenses including that of parental immunity from tort liability to
offspring. The Mroczynski court found that none of the father's acts, as
alleged by the plaintiff, constituted tortious conduct. Nevertheless, the
court held, inter alia, that the plaintifis complaint alleging willful misconduct stated a cause of action which would survive a motion to dismiss on the basis of parental immunity. The court cited Nudd and
adopted its rationale that the public policy underpinnings of the parental nonliability rule were not furthered by including willful torts within
62
the scope of the immunity.
An unusual fact pattern provided the Appellate Court of Illinois
for the Fourth District with an opportunity to apply, by analogy, the
parental immunity doctrine and its attendant limitations. In Schenk v.
Schenk, 63 a father who had been struck down and injured by an automobile operated by his seventeen-year-old, unemancipated daughter
sought to recover for his injuries. No allegation of willful or wanton
conduct was made. On motion of the defendant, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cognizable claim. 64
the child and close all courtrooms to her. Surely public policy does not demand such a
holding. [An injury inflicted upon an unemancipated child by the father while in a
drunken condition is not within the scope of parental authority. . . .The mantle of parental non-liability was never intended for a case such as this.
Id., 218 P.2d at 456.
58. 7 Ill. 2d at 619, 131 N.E.2d at 531.
59. Id.
60. 34 Ill. 2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137 (1966).
61. Id. at 452-53, 216 N.E.2d at 138-39. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment voiding the
provision in his father's will which disinherited him. The complaint asked, in the alternative, that
the father's estate be held in trust for the plaintiffs support and financial aid. Plaintiff also prayed
for damages, including punitive damages, for abandonment, destruction of the family unit, termination of the parents' relationship by divorce, denial of uninterrupted financial aid, accumulation
of a large estate at plaintiff's expense, denial of a normal home, parental affection, care, comfort,
companionship and the guidance of a normal father-child relationship, resulting in severe emotional distress and mental suffering being inflicted on the plaintiff.
62. Id. at 454-55, 216 N.E.2d at 139.
63. 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968).
64. Id. at 201-02, 241 N.E.2d at 12. According to the appellate court, the trial court's dismissal was predicated on the absence, from the plaintiff's complaint, of any allegation of willful or
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In the appellate court, the plaintiff argued that parent-child immunity should not extend to conduct that does not fall within the purview
of the parental relationship. Citing both Nudd and Mroczynski, the
court held that the public policy which supports immunity for parents
also militates for nonliability for children sued by their parents. 65 The
court also held that the same limitations that have been placed on parental immunity also attach to the immunity conferred upon offspring.
The court in Schenk interpreted Nudd as positing a two-part inquiry for determining whether particular conduct is actionable. This
inquiry states that where the injury is willful, wanton, intentional, or
criminal, then it is actionable whether or not it falls within the parentchild relationship. But, even if the misconduct is not willful, wanton,
intentional, or criminal, it may still be actionable so long as it falls
beyond the scope of the family relationship.
On the facts in Schenk, the court found that neither the father, in
crossing the city street, nor the daughter, in negligently operating the
vehicle, "were to any extent performing a duty arising out of the family
relationship or engaged in any enterprise having for its purpose the
furtherance of the family relationship. ' 66 Without setting out its reasoning, the court held that "reason and justice require that the immunity rule should not stand as an insuperable bar to redress for injuries"
67
arising from misconduct beyond the scope of the family relationship.
The Schenk court declined, however, to completely discard the
parent-child immunity rule. Pointing to Mroczynski and other cases
involving attempts to recover damages from parents for lack of affection, disruption of family life, failure to provide a pleasant home, or for
the breaking up of a home by divorce, the court indicated that a "flood
of litigation" would result from an unequivocal disavowal of the family
immunity rule. 6 8 According to the court, ordinary negligence within
the family context "is but the product of the hazards incident to inter'69
family living and common to every family.
The Schenk distinction, that parental immunity does not extend to
wanton misconduct by the defendant. This, in turn, implies that the parental immunity rule was
being applied in reverse-as a bar to a parent's tort action against a child.
65. Id. at 202, 241 N.E.2d at 13. The court held that if the underlying "public policy involved is in the interest of the State in maintaining harmony, avoiding strife, and insuring a
proper atmosphere of cooperation, discipline and understanding in the family" then there is "no
persuasive reason why a like policy is not equally involved in a parent's suit against the child for
his tortious conduct."
66. Id. at 203, 241 N.E.2d at 14.
67. d. at 206, 241 N.E.2d at 15.
68. Id. at 205-06, 241 N.E.2d at 15.
69. Id. at 206, 241 N.E.2d at 15.
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activities apart from the direct parent-child relationship, has been followed in other appellate rulings. In Johnson v. Myers, 70 the court held
that parental immunity did not act as a bar to minors' actions against
their mother for alleged ordinary negligence in operating an automobile. Further, the court in Gulledge v. Gulledge7' declined to accord in
loco parentis standing to grandparents.
Most recently the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fourth District held that parental nonliability did not bar a child's recovery for
injuries sustained as a result of a parent's negligent maintenance of a
condition on her land. In Cummings v. Jackson,72 a child was struck by
a car adjacent to her home, where untrimmed trees obstructed motorists' vision. The court reasoned that the landowner's duty to remove
visual obstructions was one owed primarily to the general public, and
only incidentally owed to family members. 73 Therefore, the court
found, under the Schenk exception, that the injury did not arise from
the family relationship and parental immunity would not bar the
74
child's claim against her mother.
POST-MOLITOR INTERPRETATIONS OF SCHOOL TORT IMMUNITY AND

IN Loco PARENTIS AUTHORITY

The 1965 Illinois School Code grant of in locoparentisauthority in
sections 24-24 and 34-84a was subsequently interpreted by the courts as
a grant of full immunity to teachers from liability for negligence. In
Woodman v. Litchfield Community School District No. 12, 75 a student
sought damages for injuries sustained when kicked in the head by a
fellow student during classroom activity. The complaint alleged that
the teacher who had directed the activity was acting as an agent of the
defendant school district and that said teacher was negligent and careless in supervising the children in the class room. The defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint, relying on a provision in Illinois' Local Governmental and Governmental Tort Immunity Act 76 that conferred upon public entities and employees an immunity from liability
70. 2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778 (1972). However, in Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank of
Chicago v. Heap, 128 Ill. App. 2d 165, 262 N.E.2d 826 (1970), a child's recovery against a father
for negligent maintenance of a stairway, resulting in injury to the child, was held to be barred by
the doctrine.
71. 51 111. App. 3d 972, 367 N.E.2d 429 (1977).
72. 57 Ill. App. 3d 68, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (1978).
73. Id. at 70, 372 N.E.2d at 1128.
74. Id.
75. 102 Ill.
App. 2d 330, 242 N.E.2d 780 (1968).

76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as the Illinois Tort Immunity Act].
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arising out of a failure to supervise an activity on public property. 77
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss.
On appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fifth District,
the plaintiff presented alternative arguments. 78 First, plaintiff argued
that the statutory provision relied on by the trial court in dismissing the
complaint dealt exclusively with the use of public property or with the
condition of such property. 79 Since her injury did not arise directly
from the use or condition of public property, the plaintiff argued that
the statute was inapposite on the specific facts. The court did not agree,
holding that the "section specifically covers 'an activity' on public prop80
erty."
The plaintiff's second argument urged that the school district, by
undertaking to provide supervision, assumed the duty to ensure that
said supervision was adequate and not careless or negligent. The appellate court dismissed this argument with some rather roundabout reasoning. The court cited another provision of Illinois' Tort Immunity
Act 8' which provides that local public entities are absolved from liability for the acts of an employee where the employee is not individually
liable. Then, the court invoked the statutory grant of parental immunity given Illinois teachers and found that the parent/guardian status
would attach in the instant case and would insulate the individual
teacher from tort liability.8 2 Since there was no wilful or wanton conduct alleged, the court held the exceptions set out in Nudd v. Matsoukas 83 and Mroczynski v. McGrath 84 to be inapplicable. Consequently,
the court ruled that the teacher's nonliability stood as a bar to any action against the school district arising out of the teacher's alleged negli85
gence.
Fustin v. Board of Education of Community Unit District No. 286
involved an action for damages brought by a high school basketball
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 3-108(a) (1975). Section 3-108(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by this Act. . . neither a local public entity nor a public
employee is liable for an injury caused by a failure to supervise an activity on or the use
of any public property.
78. 102 Ill. App. 2d at 331, 242 N.E.2d at 780.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 332, 242 N.E.2d at 781.
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-109 (1975). Section 2-109 provides:
A local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its
employee where the employee is not liable.
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-24 (1965).
83. 7 II. 2d 608, 131 N.E. 2d 525 (1956). See text accompanying notes 43-50 supra.
84. 34 Il. 2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137 (1966). See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
85. 102 Ill. App. 2d at 330, 242 N.E.2d at 782.
86, 101 Ill. App. 2d 113, 242 N.E.2d 308 (1968).
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player who sustained injuries when struck in the face by an opponent
during the course of an inter-school varsity basketball contest. The
plaintiff alleged that the game was controlled, managed, and supervised
by the defendant's agents and that those agents committed acts or omissions of negligence by failing to control the player who attacked the
plaintiff. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on virtually
87
the same grounds as did the defendant school district in Woodman.
The Fustin court adopted the language of the Woodman holding to the
extent that it was applicable to the Fustin facts, 88 and affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs complaint.
The plaintiff in Fustin had argued on appeal that the defendant's
agent knew or had reason to know of the temperament of the attacking
player and had acted negligently in allowing that player to participate
in a contest where it was reasonably foreseeable that physical contact
might result. 89 The appellate court characterized the alleged misconduct as a necessary exercise of discretion and judgment associated with
the coaches' and physical education directors' employment responsibilities. In rejecting the plaintiffs argument, the court held that a type of
quasi-judicial immunity cloaks public employees who exercise discretionary powers in the course of their duties. 90 The court in Fustin cautioned, however, that the quasi-judicial immunity does not preclude
liability for willful or wanton conduct on the part of public employees.
In Mancha v. Field Museum of Natural History,9 1 the Appellate
Court of Illinois for the First District reviewed a tort action arising out
of a class trip to a museum. The group was comprised of about fifty
students escorted by two teachers. Upon arrival at the museum, the
students were allowed to separate into groups and walk about without
supervision. During the course of the unsupervised viewing, the plain87. The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fifth District decided both Woodman and Fustin
on the same day. The defendant in Fusiin also relied upon the Illinois School Code, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 122, § 24-24 (1975). See text accompanying notes 75-85 supra.
88. 101 Ill. App. 2d at 116-17, 242 N.E.2d at 310. Fuslin included an allegation of liability
insurance indemnification on the part of the defendant school district which was not an element in
Woodman.
89. Id. at 119, 242 N.E.2d at 311. The plaintiff relied specifically on Molitor v. Kaneland
Comm. Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 I11.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
90. Id. at 121-22, 242 N.E.2d at 312. The court quoted from the Illinois Supreme Court
holding in People ex rel. Munson v. Bartels, 138 Ill. 322, 328, 27 N.E. 1091, 1092 (1891), in stating:
When the officer has the authority to hear and determine. . . the propriety of doing an
act, he is vested with judicial power. An officer will be regarded as being clothed with
judicial or quasi-judicial functions when the powers confided to him are so far discretionary that he can exercise or withhold them according to his own judgment as to what
is necessary and proper.
91. 5 Ill. App. 3d 699, 283 N.E.2d 899 (1972).
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tiff was attacked by a group of youths not associated with the school or
the field trip.
The plaintiff alleged, in his complaint, that the school district acted
negligently in allowing the students to depart from the school premises
without adequate supervision. The plaintiff also alleged that the two
teachers who accompanied the class to the museum were negligent in
their failure to properly supervise the activities of their pupils. The
trial court held that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a cause of action
92
against any of the defendants and dismissed the suit.
In affirming the dismissal, the appellate court held that although
the school district and the teachers did have a duty to exercise reasonable care in the control and supervision of the students, the incident
which gave rise to the instant suit was not a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of a trip to a museum. The court stated that "[a] teacher
cannot be required to watch the students at all times while in school, on
the grounds, or engaged in school-related activity." 93 According to the
court, the burden of nearly constant surveillance "would. . . discourage schools and teachers from affording opportunities to children to
'94
enjoy the many extracurricular activities.
The court in Mancha also indicated that the teachers were immune
from tort liability by virtue of the Woodman interpretation of the Illinois School Code and the Tort Immunity Act. The Mancha court cited
Woodman for the proposition that section 24-24 of the Illinois School
Code would protect a teacher from liability for ordinary negligence in
failing to properly supervise or discipline students. 95 The court held
that the actions and omissions of the teachers in the Mancha case were
neither willful nor wanton misconduct and, therefore, did not fall beyond the scope of the statutory immunity provision.
Merrill v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago9 6 provided the Appellate
Court of Illinois for the Second District with an opportunity to examine
the section 24-24 immunity provision in the context of a tort suit
against a non-profit private school and its staff. The plaintiff, a seventh
92. Id. at 700, 283 N.E.2d at 900. The plaintiff's complaint also contained a number of allegations and claims against the Field Museum, most of which were derived from the common law
doctrine of "attractive nuisance" as well as from property law.
93. Id. at 702, 283 N.E.2d at 902.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 703, 283 N.E.2d at 902. The Woodman interpretation is that with regard to supervision and discipline, teachers stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the pupils, and, as
a consequence, enjoy the same immunity for acts of ordinary negligence committed in the course
of their duties that a parent would for mere negligence in the context of the family relationship.
96. 8 Ill. App. 3d 910, 290 N.E.2d 259 (1972).
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grader, was blinded in one eye while cutting wire from a coil at his
teacher's direction. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss because the plaintiff failed to allege wanton or willful misconduct. In affirming the dismissal, the appellate court relied on the
Woodman construction of the Illinois School Code section 24-24 provision previously invoked in Fustin and Mancha. The Merrill court
stated, "[w]hile Section 24-24 is contained in the public school code we
cannot see any reason why it should not be equally applicable to pri97
vate schools."
KOBYLANSKI V. CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION

It was not until 1976, in Kobylanski v.Chicago Board of Education,98 that the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the provisions of sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the Illinois School Code. 99 In a four-three
decision, the court held that those sections applied to nondisciplinary
and disciplinary matters and extended to all aspects of the school program. Kobylanski was decided along with Chilton v. Cook County
School District No. 207, Maine Twp. 100 In the lower courts, the trial
court had directed a verdict in favor of the defendants in Kobylanski,
and in Chilton a jury returned a verdict against the school district.
Each verdict was affirmed on appeal, 10 leave to appeal was granted,
and the cases consolidated for hearing before the Illinois Supreme
Court.
Both Kobylanski and Chilton arose out of injuries sustained in
school physical education classes. Each complaint alleged negligent supervision or failure to provide proper supervision of students learning
to perform gymnastic maneuvers. In neither case was it alleged that
the plaintiff had proved willful and wanton misconduct on the part of
plaintiff's teachers or schools. Noting that the case was one of first impression, the court found that sections 24-24 and 34-84a conferred upon
educators in locoparentisstatus, which status the court found, without
elucidation, to confer blanket immunity from negligence. 0 2
It was plaintiffs' contention that in locoparentisstatus was limited
to disciplinary situations in which the teacher was fulfilling a parental
97. Id. at 911, 290 N.E.2d at 260.
2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976).
98. 63 Ill.
99. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a (1975).
App. 3d 459, 325 N.E.2d 666 (1975).
100. 26 I11.
101. 22 Ill.
App. 3d 551, 317 N.E.2d 714 (1974); 26 IUl. App. 3d 459, 325 N.E.2d 666 (1975).
2d at 170, 347 N.E.2d at 708. The court merely cited Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34
102. 63 Ill.
2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
I11.
2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137 (1966) and Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 I11.
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role. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected such an interpretation of the
statute, relying upon the statutory wording, "In all matters relating to
the discipline in and conduct of the schools, they stand in the relation of
parents and guardians to the pupils. This relationship shall extend to
all activities connected with the school program .... ,,103 Since physical education classes were a required part of school curriculum, the
court in Kobylanski reasoned that supervision of these classes was an
"activity connected with the school program"' 4 to which immunity
would attach irrespective of the disciplinary or the non-disciplinary
character of the activity.
It was alternatively argued by plaintiffs in Kobylanski that any immunity from negligence accorded by sections 24-24 and 34-84a was
waived by the defendant school districts' purchase of liability insurance, under the waiver provisions of section 9-103(b) of the Illinois
Tort Immunity Act.' 05 Because the adoption of the pertinent sections
of the Illinois School Code preceded enactment of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, the court relied upon section 2-111 of the latter which provides, "Nothing contained herein shall operate to deprive any public
entity of any defense heretofore existing .
,,*"106 The court declined
to consider any possible waiver of immunity, stating:
The immunity conferred upon educators by sections 24-24 and 3484a, however, is not derived from the Tort Immunity Act, but is the
result of a legislative determination that educators should stand in
the place of a parent or guardian in matters relating to discipline, the
conduct of the schools and the school children. It is this status as
parent or guardian which requires a plaintiff to prove wilful and
wanton misconduct in order to impose liability upon educators. Accordingly, the waiver provision10 7of section 9-103(b) is inapplicable to
the present factual situations.
103. 163 Ill. 2d at 173, 347 N.E.2d at 703 quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a
(1975) (emphasis supplied by the court).
104. 63 Ill.
2d at 173, 347 N.E.2d at 708.
105. Id., 347 N.E.2d at 709. Section 9-103(b) of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act provides as
follows:
Every policy for insurance coverage issued to a local public entity shall provide or
be endorsed to provide that the company issuing such policy waives any right to refuse
payment or to deny liability thereto within the limits of said policy by reason of the nonliability of the insured public entity for the wrongful or negligent acts of itself or its
employees and its immunity from suit by reason of the defenses and immunities provided in this Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 9-103(b) (1967). Section 34-18.1 of the School Code requires districts of
greater than 500,000 population to purchase insurance, but does not contain the waiver of immunity requirement of section 9-103(b).
106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-111 (1975).
107. 63 Ill. 2d at 174, 347 N.E.2d at 710. An incisive analysis of the waiver agreement in
Kobylanski is contained in Kerwin, Tort Liabilityfor Illinois Schools under Section 9-103 of the
Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 441 (1976).
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A strong dissent was filed by Justice Goldenhersch, joined by
Chief Justice Ward and Justice Schaefer. 0 8 The dissent characterized

the majority's construction of the Illinois School Code immunity provisions as "a distortion of the language," 10 9 urging that the statutes
should apply solely to disciplinary matters. The dissenting justices further did not concur with the majority's precedential treatment of the
Illinois Tort Immunity Act. The justices felt that the Illinois School
Code and the Tort Immunity Act ought to be read in pari materia.1 0
Citing Harvey v. Clyde Park DistrictI ' and Stubblefield v. City of Chicago, 1 2 the dissent expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of sections 24-24 and 34-84a, since under the Harvey doctrine "classifications
designed to confer immunity on a local governmental entity must be
based, not on the nature of the entity, but on the type of activity or
function involved." 113 Finally, the dissent differed with the majority's
reading of the two Illinois cases" 14 interpreting parental tort immunity.
The dissenting justices did not feel that these cases establish parental
immunity as a total bar to actions sounding in negligence."15
POST-KOBYi4NsKI INTERPRETATIONS OF ILLINOIS SCHOOL TORT
IMMUNITY LAW

In 1978, the Illinois Supreme Court presented the first post-Kobylanski opinion on school tort immunity. Gerrity v. Beatty", 6 was
brought by a high school student who sustained serious injury in an
inter-school football game. The student filed suit against the school
district, alleging negligence in furnishing defective and ill-fitting ath108. 63 Ill. 2d at 176, 347 N.E.2d at 711 (Goldenhersch, J., dissenting).
109. Id. The dissenting opinion proferred the following analysis:
It seems clear that the statutes apply only to discipline. To reach a contrary interpretation requires a distortion of the language of the second sentence of these sections.
Properly construed, that sentence refers to all matters related to the discipline in the
schools and the conduct of the school children.' The phrase 'and conduct of the schools,'
which is emphasized by the majority opinion, does not stand alone. The words 'discipline in' cannot refer to 'school children; those words refer to the 'schools.' Similarly, the
words 'conduct of do not relate to 'the schools'; they refer to 'the school children.' If the
phrase 'conduct of the schools' is to be torn from its context and given independent
significance, the following sentence, which provides that '[t]his relationship shall extend
to all activities connected with the school program,' is rendered redundant.
Id.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
2d 451,
115.
116.

Id.
32 I11.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
48 Ill. 2d 267, 269 N.E.2d 504 (1971).
63 Ill. 2d at 178, 347 N.E.2d at 712.
Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill.
216 N.E.2d 137 (1966).
63 Ill. 2d at 176, 347 N.E.2d at 711.
71 111. 2d 47, 373 N.E.2d 1323 (1978).
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letic equipment. ' 7 The trial court granted the school district's motion
to strike the count on the ground that under section 34-84a of the Illinois School Code," 8 as construed by Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of
Education,"9 the student could not recover unless he proved willful
and wanton conduct on the part of the school personnel. 20 The Illinois
Supreme Court allowed the appeal to be transferred,' 21 the trial court
having found there to be no just reason for delaying enforcement and
appeal.

22

The majority opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court by Justice Underwood first considered the general rule of parental immunity from
suits brought by children for mere negligence as it had been extended
to the in loco parentis authority of school districts by Illinois School
Code Sections 24-24 and 34-84a. 23 The court concluded that its previous holdings in Kobylanski, Mroczynski, and Nudd plus the terms of

sections 24-24 and 34-84a had conferred in locoparentisstatus to school
districts in nondisciplinary as well as disciplinary situations. 24 Thus,
the plaintiff students in these cases had to prove willful and wanton
25
misconduct in order to recover.
The court found in Gerrity, however, that the facts of the case did
not bring it within the intended scope of sections 24-24 and 34-84a of
the Illinois School Code. 126 The trial court in Gerrity had concluded
that Kobylanski did "not distinguish between discipline, supervision
and furnishing of equipment, but extended to any and all conduct of
the schools including the furnishing of equipment for athletic
27
teams."1
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the interpretation by
the trial court. The supreme court determined that the Kobylanski decision dealt with the teacher-student relationship "in matters relating to
the teacher's personal supervision and control of the conduct or physical movement of the student."' 28 The court noted that Merrill v. Catho117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 52-53, 373 N.E.2d at 1326.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a (1975).
63 I11.
2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976).
71 111. 2d at 49, 373 N.E.2d at 1324.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See text accompanying notes 52-62 and 98-115 supra.
71 111. 2d at 49, 373 N.E. 2d at 1324.
Id. at 51, 373 N.E.2d at 1325.
Id.
Id.
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tic Bishop, 129 Mancha v. FieldMuseum of NaturalHistory,130 Fustin v.
Board of Education,'3' and Woodman v. Litchfield Community School
District No. 12132 also dealt with this same personal student-teacher
relationship which sections 24-24 and 34-84a were designed to protect.
The court noted that these sections:
reflect a legislative determination that the orderly conduct of the
schools and the maintenance of a sound learning atmosphere require
that there be a personal relationship between teacher and student in
which the teacher has disciplinary and supervisory authority similar
to that which exists between parent and child. It is evident that this
relationship would be seriously jeopardized if teachers and school
districts were amenable to ordinary negligence actions for133accidents
occurring in the course of the exercise of such authority.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, distinguished Gerrity from
the Kobylanski-type situation. The court found that Gerrity did not
allege negligence arising out of the personal teacher-student relationship, but rather alleged negligence in connection with what the court
considered to be the "separate function" 134 of furnishing athletic equipment which was alleged to be inadequate and defective and "which was
known, or which in the exercise of ordinary care should have been
known, to be liable to cause injury to the plaintiff."'' 35 The court in
Gerrity distinguished the public policy considerations of authorizing
and, indeed, encouraging teachers to have broad discretion in matters
relating to the teacher's personal supervision and control of the conduct
or physical movement of the student from the situation where the
school district has allegedly provided inadequate and defective athletic
equipment. 36 The Illinois Supreme Court concluded:
On the contrary, public policy considerations argue rather strongly
against any interpretation which would relax a school district's obligation to insure that equipment provided for students in connection
with activities of this type is fit for the purpose. To hold school districts to the duty of ordinary care in such matters would not be unduly burdensome, nor does it appear to us to be inconsistent with the
intended
purposes of sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the School
137
Code.

Thus, the court held that Kobylanski was not controlling in Gerrity
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

8 I11.
App. 3d 910, 290 N.E.2d 259 (1972). See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
5 Ii. App. 3d 699, 283 N.E.2d 899 (1972). See text accompanying notes 91-95 supra.
101 Ill.
App. 2d 113, 242 N.E.2d 308 (1968). See text accompanying notes 86-90 supra.
102 Il. App. 2d 330, 242 N.E.2d 780 (1968). See text accompanying notes 75-85 supra.
71 111. 2d at 51, 373 N.E.2d at 1325.
Id. at 52, 373 N.E.2d at 1326.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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where the facts of the case fell outside the scope of sections 24-24 and
34-84a of the Illinois School Code.
Several subsequent appellate court decisions have followed the
rule of Gerrity, and other appellate courts have carved exceptions to
Kobylanski. Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education 38 was factually
similar to Gerrily. An injured high school football player brought suit
against the Board of Education and his coaches. He alleged that his
coaches were negligent in inspecting and testing equipment; that their
supervision was negligent, in requiring students to play on synthetic
turf; that the Board was negligent in providing inadequately trained
coaches; and, that his coaches were negligent in their supervision and
training of the school football team. Portions of his complaint were
dismissed by the lower court. On appeal, the court followed the Gerrity
rationale, finding that a cause of action was stated for the supply of
defective equipment, and for failure to inspect the equipment. The
court expanded on Gerrity in two corollaries: The plaintiff's coaches
were held individually liable in ordinary negligence for furnishing defective equipment, and for failing to inspect it. 139 Further, the court
distinguished section 1-101 of the Tort Immunity Act, 140 which affords
immunity to public employees in the exercise of discretionary functions, stating: "We believe the distinction articulated by the court in
Gerrity in the context of the School Code likewise is applicable to the
Tort Immunity Act: the furnishing of equipment to athletic teams is a
function separate and apart from the exercise of discretionary authority."' 4 ' The Tort Immunity Act had not been discussed in Gerrity.
In Edmondson v. Chicago Board of Education, 42 the appellate
court held that teacher's aides and school community representatives
are not "teachers" within the definition of the School Code, 143 and thus
are not entitled to the immunity granted therein. The Tort Immunity
Act,144 however, would have afforded immunity for a failure to supervise, but for the purchase of insurance by the Board of Education. Addressing a point raised but not resolved in Gerrity or Kobylanski, the
138. 60 11. App. 3d 729, 377 N.E.2d 55 (1978).
139. Id. at 733-34, 377 N.E.2d at 57.
140. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 1-101 (1977).
141. Id See also Lynch v. Board of Education of Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10, County of Madison, 5th Dist. No. 78-393 (May 16, 1979). However, in Cipolla v.
Bloom Twp. H.S. Dist. No. 206, 26 Ill. Dec. 407, 388 N.E.2d 31 (1979), the court held to the
Kobylanski standard and required plaintiff to plead and prove willful and wanton misconduct
where injuries arose out of an alleged failure to supervise.
142. 62 11. App. 3d 211, 379 N.E.2d 27 (1978).
143. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-84 (1977).
144. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 3-108 (1977).
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court found that section 9-103 of the Tort Immunity Act, 4 5 which provides for waiver of immunity in the event insurance is purchased, was
controlling as to the defendant Chicago Board of Education. The
Board, then, by its purchase of insurance, waived immunity and was
liable in ordinary negligence for teacher's aides' failure to supervise.
Most recently, in O'Brien v. Township High School District 214,146
it was held that the furnishing of medical treatment by teachers,
coaches, or student trainers is an activity outside the teacher-student
relationship, and is therefore controlled by Gerrity rather than Kobylanski. O'Brien involved a high school football player whose infected leg
was treated with unsterilized instruments by a student trainer, resulting
in severe osteomyelitis. The reviewing court held that such a situation
was not within the ambit of the teacher-student relationship, stating,
"When medical treatment is undertaken by a school or its agent, public
policy considerations dictate an obligation to ensure that it is competently rendered. To hold school districts to an ordinary care standard
' 47
in this area does not seem unduly burdensome."'
CONCLUSION

It appears that Illinois law no longer grants full parental immunity
to school districts and their employees. Schenk v. Schenk 148 has been
followed by at least two courts 149 and it now appears that Illinois courts
recognize at least two exceptions to the rule of parental immunity:
where the act complained of is willful, wanton, or reckless and where
the act complained of falls outside the ambit of the family relationship.
The parallels to be drawn from the relaxation of the rule of parental
immunity and school immunity based on in locoparentis will certainly
deserve judicial consideration.
Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court's most recent ruling, Gerrity v.
Beatty, as well as later appellate court cases, echo the "scope of the
relationship" distinction drawn in Schenk. Thus, although Kobylanski
remains the law with respect to the direct relationship of teacher-pupil
supervision and discipline, Gerrity and subsequent appellate decisions
have clearly carved a major exception to Kobylanski's absolutist inter145. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 9-103 (1977).
146. 1st Dist. No. 77-1673 (June 28, 1979).
147. Id.
148. 100 Il.App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968).
149. Cumming v. Jackson, 57 Il.App. 3d 68, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (1978); Gulledge v. Gulledge,
51 111. App. 3d 972, 367 N.E.2d 429 (1977); Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778
(1972).
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pretation of the Illinois School Code's immunity provisions and may
signal the beginning of an approach to school immunity based not on
dogma, but upon analysis of the nature and extent of the teacher-student relationship.

